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"white" meant Caucasian, as distinguished from Mongolian or yellow, Ethiopian or black, American or red, Malay or brown — following Blumenbach's classification in 1781. Accordingly, naturalization has been denied Chinese, Japanese, Burmese, Kanakas, and Canadian Indians. *In re Ah Yup*, 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 155; *In re Saito*, *supra*; *In re Po*, 7 N. Y. Misc. 471; *In re Kanaka Nian*, 6 Utah 259; *In re Burton*, 1 Alaska 111. Anomalously, a "pure-blooded Mexican" has been naturalized. *In re Roderiguez*, 81 Fed. 337. No half-breed is a "white person." *In re Knight*, 171 Fed. 299. It has been doubted whether the early statutes were intended to include the complex groups of Western Asiatics. *In re Balsara*, 171 Fed. 294. To classify them now according to the ethnological standards of a century ago is impracticable. From the groupings of early censuses, and from certain modern statutory definitions, however, it is arguable that the term was merely a "catch-all" for others than negroes and Indians. See U. S. REV. STAT. (1878) § 2206; ARKANSAS, DIG. OF STATS. § 6632. Then as Mongolians and Malays are excluded by judicial construction, all Europeans and Asiatics not allied to these races are presumably eligible.

**BANKRUPTCY — DISSOLUTION OF LIENS — MONEY BORROWED TO GIVE PREFERENCE.** — Shortly before bankruptcy, an insolvent assigned to the defendant certain accounts to secure advances then made to him, and used the money to pay favored creditors. The defendant, when advancing the money, had cause to know the insolvent intended to prefer creditors therewith. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to have the assignment set aside as fraudulent. *Held*, that this is not a fraudulent assignment. *Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co.*, 174 Fed. 518 (C. C. A., Second Circ.).

It seems clear that the words of § 67 e of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud," were meant to have the same artificial construction as in the statute of 13 Elizabeth. *In re Bloch*, 142 Fed. 674. *Contra*, *In re McLam*, 97 Fed. 922. And since that statute did not include preferences, this section should not affect transactions preferential in intent. *Cf. Blackmore v. Parkes*, 81 Fed. 899. Yet in several cases, the courts, in order to discourage preferences, have held transfers similar to the one attacked in the principal case void under this provision. *Roberts v. Johnson*, 151 Fed. 567. *Cf. Ex parte Mendell*, 1 Low. (U. S.) 506. Independently of this section the desired result might sometimes be attained, for transactions intended to promote illegality are often invalid. *Hull v. Ruggles*, 56 N. Y. 424. And though at common law a preference was legal, it defeats the aim of bankruptcy statutes and is therefore improper. *Pirie v. Chicago Tile & Trust Co.*, 182 U. S. 438. See 15 HARV. L. REV. 829, 834, 843. And any court willing to strain the statutes to prevent a preference would probably regard it as serious enough to taint the whole conduct of those who by advancements knowingly make it possible. But actual knowledge of the preferential intent is required; and reasonable cause to anticipate such a result is not sufficient to taint the transaction. *Cf. Adams v. Coulliard*, 102 Mass. 167. Hence the principal case seems sound.

**BANKRUPTCY — PROPERTY PASSING TO TRUSTEE — SEAT IN STOCK EXCHANGE AND CLAIMS DUE ON FLOOR TRANSACTIONS.** — Under the rules of the Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York, an insolvent member's seat is to be sold, his floor transactions closed out, and the proceeds appropriated to the payment of (1) indebtedness to the exchange, (2) claims arising out of transactions on the floor, and (3) loans from members. *Held*, that a trustee in bankruptcy takes these proceeds subject to the rules of the exchange, and must give priority to exchange creditors in the order named. *In re Gregory*, 174 Fed. 629 (C. C. A., Second Circ.).

A seat in a stock exchange is property which, on the bankruptcy of the member, passes to his trustee. *Page v. Edmunds*, 187 U. S. 596. But since membership is a personal privilege, created by vote of the exchange, that body may